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WHAT IS A ‘FAIR’ PRICE? ETHICS AS SENSEMAKING 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
While the deliberative democracy approach to ethics seeks to bridge universalist reason and contextual 
judgment to explain the emergence of intersubjective agreements, it remains unclear how these two 
are reconciled in practice. We argue that a sensemaking approach is useful for examining how ethical 
truces emerge in equivocal situations. To understand how actors navigate through ethical complexity, 
we conducted an ethnographic inquiry into the multi-stakeholder practices of setting Fairtrade mini-
mum prices. We offer three contributions. First, we develop a process model of ethics as sensemaking 
that explains how actors come to collectively agree on what is ethical in complex situations even if no 
complete consensus arises. Second, our findings suggest that moral intuition and affect also motivate 
ethical judgment alongside moral reasoning. Third, an ethical sensemaking perspective explains some 
of the pitfalls actors confront in coping with ethical complexities in practice and how they attend to 
the challenges arising from stark inequalities in extreme contexts. 
 
 
Keywords: sensemaking, Fairtrade, Habermas, communicative rationality, discourse ethics, fair, eth-
ics, political corporate social responsibility, price, multi-stakeholder. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
“With rooibos: All the information is available [data on the cost of sustainable production]. But 
then when you put this altogether you have to make something meaningful out of a mess!” 
 
After protracted multi-stakeholder deliberations that continued for almost three years, Fairtrade In-
ternational, the organization behind the Fairtrade label, announced the Fairtrade Minimum Price for 
rooibos tea from South Africa, describing it as a “milestone in the development of Fairtrade stand-
ards.” While alternative trade organizations (ATOs) used to directly negotiate “fair” prices with black 
and poor smallholder farmers struggling under colonial legacies in post-apartheid South Africa, rapid 
market growth pressured Fairtrade into establishing a standard minimum fair price. But despite the or-
ganization’s pledge to set fair prices, this price appeared to disadvantage smallholder farmers with 
higher costs of production compared to large-scale plantations. We question how participatory multi-
stakeholder deliberation could result in a minimum price below the cost of production of smallholder 
farmers for whom Fairtrade had initially been founded. Is this a “fair” outcome? How do stakeholders 
make sense of what is fair in ethically complex situations?  
A fundamental challenge for organizations seeking social justice is coping with ethical complexity 
– making something ethically “meaningful out of a mess,” as our respondent above put it. Contexts of 
moral decision making are often ambiguous and conflictual where no transcendental golden rules or 
universal guiding principles can readily be applied to consensually resolve disagreements. This high-
lights the “excruciating difficulty of being moral” (Bauman 1993, p. 248). While moral philosophies 
can guide organizational decision-making (e.g., Scherer and Palazzo 2007), they identify different ba-
ses for making ethical decisions (Robertson and Crittenden 2003) – from adhering to principles (e.g., 
Kant 1997) to learning what is ethical in context (e.g., MacIntyre 1984). On the one hand, no prede-
termined meta-rule can be applied to resolve a moral dilemma, because it is the idiosyncrasies in prac-
tice that create the dilemma (Clegg, Kornberger, and Rhodes 2007). On the other hand, the “normative 
chaos of contextualism” without recourse to any valid norm beyond a single case, does not provide a 
sound ethical foundation in a diverse society (Habermas 1992, p. 140-41). If ethics cannot be defined 
by universal principles outside the concrete context of action, yet making moral claims needs an ob-
jective reference point, how do actors decide what is ethical in complex and equivocal situations?   
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To address this issue, proponents of discourse ethics have argued for a constructionist framework 
that avoids the pitfalls of both objectivism and subjectivism (Benhabib 1992; Habermas 1996; 
Outhwaite 2009). In particular, they have emphasized the role of deliberative dialogue as a collective, 
inter-subjective, and interpretive process for establishing shared meaning and reconciling multiple eth-
ical viewpoints. Deliberative dialogue involves a process of making arguments acceptable and legiti-
mate by fulfilling “the validity conditions of moral judgments and norms” (Habermas 2003, p. 248). 
Local justifications can transcend the “provinciality of their spatiotemporal contexts” (Habermas 
1996, p. 323) and claim intersubjective validity for an emergent norm. 
While the deliberative approach provides a normative foundation for what constitutes a morally 
valid consensus, it remains unclear how universal reasoning and contextual judgments are reconciled 
in practice to reach an intersubjective agreement. This may particularly hold in situations laced with 
moral ambiguity, where clashing norms and principles demand contradictory things of a person. We 
thus need to understand how participants balance contextual ethical exigencies with broader moral 
norms to establish an intersubjective moral position. Given the distance between normative theory and 
the complex, messy, and often emotionally charged world of practice, a sensemaking approach holds 
promise for understanding how deliberating parties construct “plausible accounts of equivocal situa-
tions” (Weick 2012, p. 145) and make “intersubjective sense of shared meanings” (Gephart et al. 
2010, p. 284) about what is fair.  While sensemaking has often been regarded as a cognitive process, 
others see it as a process of social construction – “an issue of language, talk, and communication” 
(Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld 2005, p. 409; Gephart 1992) – through which communicative selves 
can “get transformed during interaction such that a joint or merged subjectivity develops” (Weick 
1993, p. 642). For ethically contentious issues, sensemaking involves a normative dimension to con-
struct shared moral interpretations in line with institutionalized expectations (Weber and Glynn 2006). 
Examining the processes of ethical sensemaking in equivocal situations (Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 
2008) can reveal how actors interpret contextual cues and intersubjectively construct meaning to move 
from ethical complexity to ethical truces. 
To understand how actors navigate through ethical complexity, we conducted an ethnographic in-
quiry into the multi-stakeholder ethical decision-making practices at Fairtrade International. We ex-
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amined critical moments of multi-party dialogue for setting a “Fairtrade minimum price” (FTMP) in 
three cases; tea, cotton, and coffee produced in developing countries. Participants struggled to make 
meaning “out of a mess,” and reconcile conflicting views on what is fair. Our analysis of stakeholder 
negotiations suggests that actors coped with ethical complexity through sensemaking mechanisms, 
which enabled them to tame ethical heterogeneity and construct an acceptable norm. However, these 
mechanisms also unraveled further ethical complexities, leading to ongoing cycles of ethical sense-
making and “sensebreaking” (Pratt 2000) to reach an ethical truce. 
We offer three contributions to scholarship in organizational ethics and sensemaking. First, we de-
velop a process model to explain how actors make sense of ethical dilemmas to reach ethical truces. 
While sensemaking scholarship has explained how people “produce, negotiate, and sustain a shared 
sense of meaning” (Gephart et al. 2010, p. 285; Maitlis and Christianson 2014), less attention has been 
paid to the normative dimension of how parties make sense of the ethical complexity in practice and 
establish shared meaning. While scholars have explained the role of time (Kaplan and Orlikowski 
2013), power (Clark and Geppert 2011), emotion (Maitlis, Vogus and Lawrence 2013) and materiality 
(Whiteman and Cooper 2011), we bring ethics into the realm of sensemaking to explain how actors 
make sense of ethical dilemmas and show how ethics is a process of sensemaking and meaning con-
struction regarding moral questions. While this resonates with Habermas’s notion of communicative 
rationality, we explain how parties may not achieve a broadly consensual position, yet still reach pro-
visional ethical truces (cf., Rao and Kenney 2008) based on a minimal level of agreement (Ansari, Wi-
jen and Gray, 2013; Donnellon, Gray, and Bougon 1986). Ethical processes may thus involve inter-
subjective sensemaking to achieve plausible truces rather than consensual outcomes. Second, our find-
ings suggest that moral intuition and affect also motivate ethical judgment (Haidt 2001; Zajonc 1980) 
alongside moral reasoning. As actors carry moral predispositions and sentiments (Margolis 2004), 
their determinations of what is ethical or not, are not only based on rational and deliberative reason-
ing, but may also be influenced by the “passional” (Nussbaum 1986) and by whether something 
“feels” wrong or right (Sonenshein 2007; Welsh and Ordonez 2014). Third, while political CSR 
scholars have emphasized deliberative dialogue as the normative foundation for multi-stakeholder 
governance (Gilbert and Rasche 2007; Scherer and Palazzo 2007), our study involving extreme con-
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texts revealed some of the challenges to the use of a deliberative approach. The primary goal of social 
development initiatives in contexts marked by extreme disparities is to reallocate resources to margin-
alized groups that may requires “redistributive direct democracy” rather than “Northern inspired” de-
liberative democracy (Gibson 2012, p. 412). The very exercise of seeking a rational consensus risks 
reducing value pluralism valorised by deliberative democracy (Fraser 1997). While a Habermasian 
approach is part of critical theory that aims to empower the unprivileged (Rehg and Bohman 2001), 
an ethics as sensemaking lens may reveal how deliberating actors cope with ethical complexities in at-
tending to challenges arising from exploitation and inequalities (Outhwaite 2009). 
Next, we describe our theoretical motivations and method, report in-depth findings on the rooibos 
case that highlights the challenges of ethical deliberation, develop a model of ethics as sensemaking 
by drawing on all three cases, rooibos, coffee, and cotton, and offer implications for theory. 
THEORETICAL MOTIVATIONS: COPING WITH ETHICAL COMPLEXITY 
Coping with ethical complexity is often an inevitable and, at times, unwelcome tasks confronting or-
ganizations (Bersoff and Koeppl 1993; Trevino and Weaver 2003). Ethical complexity describes situa-
tions where disagreements occur over which norms and values are at stake or should be given priority 
(Gehman, Garud and Trevino 2013). Due to indeterminacy and equivocality, no pre-defined universal-
ly accepted principle or meta-norm can resolve ethical complexity (Clegg et al. 2007).  
Various moral philosophies provide different and, at times, conflicting bases for what is considered 
ethical. In the tradition of Kant’s (1997) categorical imperative, proponents of a universalistic perspec-
tive emphasize the unity of an ethical foundation of reason that determines universalizable duties and 
ethically sound courses of action. Contextualist and particularistic perspectives, advanced by practice 
ethics scholars in the Aristotelian tradition, link morality to the “socially local and particular” (Mac-
Intyre 1984, p. 126; Young 1990). A distinction can thus be made between principle based approaches 
(emphasizing the use of rational, objective, universal, and impartial principles in ethical analysis) and 
practice based approaches (emphasizing historical virtues or set of ideals to which actors aspire and 
develop through learning and practice). Aristotle’s (1985) notion of pragmatic wisdom explains why 
practical choices cannot be “captured in a system of universal rules” (Nussbaum 1986, pp. 303-4); the 
particulars of any given situation are mutable, indeterminate and non-repeatable. Hence, a concern for 
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situated judgments supplants any “simple belief in the unproblematic application of universal norms 
or imperatives” (ibid., pp. 294-95). However, without any higher-order values, rules, and principles, 
moral judgments may be too relativistic, arbitrary or parochial. If ethics cannot be defined by univer-
sal principles outside the concrete context of action, yet making moral judgments needs some “refer-
ence point,” then how do actors decide what is ethical, fair or responsible in complex situations?   
A Third Way? Discourse Ethics and Deliberative Approaches  
Discourse ethics, and its more pragmatic variant of deliberative democracy, has sought to bridge uni-
versalistic and particularistic perspectives (e.g., Habermas 1992; Scherer and Patzer 2011). This ap-
proach has been influential in organizational scholarship to theorize the role of corporations in pro-
cesses of public will formation and multi-stakeholder dialogue to produce moral norms of global gov-
ernance (Gilbert and Rasche 2007; Scherer and Palazzo 2007). Jürgen Habermas – a leading propo-
nent of discourse ethics – has taken an explicit communications turn in order to provide a new norma-
tive foundation for moral agreements in situations of ethical pluralism, where no norm or principle 
can, a priori, be regarded as morally superior. In his theory of communicative rationality, Habermas 
retains a Kantian emphasis on reason and moral validity, yet adds a more Aristotelian concern with the 
practical and the contextual. This aims at achieving a synthesis of a “universalist model of moral con-
versation [Kant]” and “contextual judgment [Aristotle]” that situates decisions in the space between 
the generality of a rule and the singularity of the unique situation (Benhabib 1992, p. 54).  
The deliberative approach to ethics emphasizes debate over contentious ethical issues whereby eth-
ical meaning is established intersubjectively through rationally achieved consensus (e.g., Habermas 
1992). Achieving intersubjective agreements involves the “nonleveling and nonappropriating inclu-
sion of the other in his otherness” (Habermas 1998, p. 4; original emphasis).  For people to be willing 
to argue, they must assume the possibility of an “ideal speech situation” as “unavoidable presupposi-
tions of argumentation” that includes freedom of access, participation with equal rights, truthfulness 
of the participants, and “absence of coercion” (Habermas 1993, p. 56). While these conditions are a 
counter-factual idealization, they are nevertheless necessary presuppositions for even participating in 
argumentation (Benhabib 1992). Deliberation cannot make incompatible perspectives compatible, but 
may enable consent by allowing participants to recognize the moral merit in others’ claims.  
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Despite the promise of the deliberative dialogue to produce collective decisions by bridging uni-
versality and particularity (Carpini, Cook and Jacobs 2004), it remains unclear how intersubjective 
positions emerge in practice. Specifically, the emphasis on rational acceptability has been questioned 
on at least three fronts. First, in fragmented and dynamic situations, where radically disparate concep-
tions of morals, norms and orientations clash; a unanimous agreement may be neither possible nor de-
sirable (Mouffe 2005). Habermas may have moved away from a consensus theory of truth toward a 
more pragmatic concern for establishing intersubjective validity and “moral rightness” (Outhwaite 
2009) – an epistemic notion for revising our moral and ethical interpretation in light of our interac-
tions with one another (Habermas 2003). Nevertheless, Habermas’ conceptualization of the quality of 
rational argumentation may inhibit recognizing radically different parties as equal interaction partners 
(Scherer and Patzer 2011). Privileging consensus among these parties as a normative ideal may lead to 
homogenizing politics “played out in the moral register” and a “conflictual consensus,” where people 
neither transcend their narrow stances, nor constructively adapt their positions, but rather simply con-
cede to a political compromise (Mouffe 2005, p. 75; McCarthy 1996). Second, feminist scholars in 
particular have criticized the ideal of impartiality in deliberations that “abstracts from the particulari-
ties of situation” and neglects the role of personal relationships (Young 1990, p. 97). People are 
shaped by their relationships of responsibility and care, which are inescapably woven into the lan-
guage of deliberation (Robinson 2011). Moral claims are constituted by people’s relations with others, 
including power relations. Weaker parties may be unable to articulate injustice and systemic neglect in 
rational deliberations (Held 2006; Robinson 2011), particularly in contexts pervaded by structural re-
lations of dependency and dominance. Third, communicative rationality privileges deliberative rea-
soning over intuitive reactions for making ethical judgments. While rational acceptability can consti-
tute a moral point of view, individuals may also use a “gut” reaction to intuitively judge a particular 
situation (Haidt 2001; Sonsenshein 2007). Consequently, individuals’ determinations of what is just or 
fair are not necessarily based on rational-cognitive process of deliberation but, rather, are also influ-
enced by a “how do I feel about it” heuristic of a situation.  
The three critiques highlight how deliberants struggle between moral and political, impartial and 
partial, and rational and intuitive – to make ethical judgments. Deliberative democracy is a normative 
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theory that proposes conditions under which morally legitimate consensus can emerge (Scherer and 
Patzer 2011). While empirical evidence from political science suggests that actual communication 
does not usually satisfy ideal speech conditions (e.g. Carpini et al. 2004; Ryfe 2005), scholars have 
argued that the aim of empirical research is to engage with deliberative theory not as a testable hy-
pothesis but as a critical phenomenon (Thompson 2008). It is thus worth examining how parties im-
mersed in specific ethical dilemmas deal with situational contingencies and produce shared meaning 
of what is ethical. 
Ethics as Sensemaking  
Coping with the question of ethics in deliberative processes may confront actors with “unintelligible” 
situations where “there is no obvious way to engage the world” (Weick et al. 2005, p. 409). The 
sensemaking literature (e.g., Maitlis and Christianson 2014) can enable us to move towards an under-
standing of ethical meaning as situated and emergent as parties cope with ethical complexities in prac-
tice. Driven by approximation rather than precision (Weick 1995), sensemaking explains how actors 
create plausible and institutionally sensible accounts in equivocal and ambiguous situations. Sense-
making and deliberative approaches are conceptually compatible as “communication is a central com-
ponent of sensemaking” (Weick et al. 2005, p. 413). In fact, “the conditions of valid communication 
discussed by Habermas (1979) presuppose at every point the operation of sensemaking practices,” 
which make speech acts comprehensible (Gephart 1992, p. 118). In particular, the constructionist ap-
proach to sensemaking with roots in the symbolic interactionist literature regards sensemaking as “a 
fundamentally social process” in which “organization members interpret their environment in and 
through interactions with each other, constructing accounts that allow them to comprehend the world” 
(Maitlis 2005, p. 21). From this perspective, “sensemaking occurs and can be studied in the discourses 
of social members – the intersubjective social world – rather than simply occurring in their minds” 
(Gephart 1992, p. 1470) and is concerned with the “conversational and social practices (methods) 
through which the members of a society socially construct a sense of shared meanings” (Gephart 
1992, p. 1469). The exercise of moral judgements and morality itself – that which needs to be under-
stood and reflected upon – is something people construct in a specific situation.  
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While sensemaking is a promising approach to understanding processes of ethical meaning mak-
ing, some gaps remain. In the realm of ethics, “surprisingly, researchers know little empirically about 
these processes of sensemaking” (Sonenshein 2007, p. 1035) and how parties make sense of the ethi-
cal complexity they encounter and establish a shared sense of ethical meaning. In particular, it remains 
unclear how validity construction is reconciled with situational contingencies. We thus ask: How do 
actors cope with ethical complexity and intersubjectively establish an account of what is ethical? 
METHODS 
Research Design 
Our research was based on an open-ended and inductive research design that was informed by a broad 
interest in understanding the micro-practices of ethical deliberation in organizations. A sensemaking 
lens on ethical deliberation sensitized us to how establishing intersubjective meaning is a continuous 
process, rather than an episodic event. Situated interactions and everyday discourse becomes as much 
the object of analysis as formal deliberative events. This requires deep engagement with field practi-
tioners over a period of time. We thus conducted an organizational ethnography in the secretariat of 
Fairtrade International. We chose this research site for two reasons. First, the standards setting body is 
an emblematic example of the role of multi-stakeholder dialogue in developing norms for fair trading 
practices. Standards setting was designed around deliberative criteria such as broad and equal partici-
pation, stakeholder consultation, democratic representation and consensual decision making, allowing 
us to study ethical deliberation in vivo. Second, studying how Fairtrade went about the task of setting 
Fairtrade Minimum Prices for certified products – the core task of the organization – could reveal how 
organizational participants and stakeholders engaged with the complex notion of what is “fair.” This 
allowed us to closely observe the sensemaking process through which deliberants worked to establish 
the meaning of fairness, and pin it down to a discrete number, amid overwhelming complexity.  
Empirical setting: Fairtrade Labeling and setting Fairtrade Minimum Prices 
Fairtrade International, a non-profit, multi-stakeholder umbrella association, was established in 
1997 by national labeling initiatives to set “global standards of fairness” (FLO 2008). The first 
Fairtrade product label for coffee, Max Havelaar, grew out of a partnership between indigenous Mex-
ican coffee growers and a Dutch NGO in 1988. The aim was to scale up the impact of fair trade by 
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developing a certification mark that could ensure consumer trust in ethically sourced products. By ear-
ly 2000s Fairtrade had expanded to include tea, cocoa, cotton and fruit and penetrated mainstream 
markets in many consumer countries. After years of double-digit growth, global Fairtrade sales 
reached Euros 4.8 billion in 2012 involving 1.3 million producers and workers in over 70 countries.  
The cornerstone of Fairtrade’s ethical premise was to guarantee a Fairtrade Minimum Price 
(FTMP) and premium. This aimed to address the “injustice of low prices by guaranteeing that produc-
ers receive fair terms of trade and fair prices however unfair the conventional market is” (FLO 2008; 
Reinecke 2010). The FTMP was set by Fairtrade’s Standards Committee (SC). The multi-stakeholder 
body met several times a year at Fairtrade’s secretariat in Bonn, Germany to set “fair prices,” drafted 
by Fairtrade’s Standards Unit. We chose the Standards Unit as our unit of observation, as its key task 
was to coordinate multi-stakeholder decision-making processes on FTMPs and premiums for agricul-
tural commodities. Participating in this unit’s daily life allowed one author to observe and interact 
with permanent staff and different parties engaged in dialogue, and gain an insider’s “feel” for the 
complexities involved in ethical decision-making. According to Fairtrade’s Standard Operating Pro-
cedure, the FTMP was defined as the price that covers the average “costs of sustainable production” 
(CoSP). A price setting project began with the process of “price researches.” The Standard Unit col-
lected CoSP data from producers through questionnaires and field studies and drafted price proposals 
based on this data. These proposals went through stakeholder consultation rounds to give everyone the 
opportunity to participate and comment on price proposals. Stakeholder representatives in the SC then 
deliberated to adjudicate among competing claims and yield “fair” decisions on prices. Together, the 
Standards Unit and SC saw their role as a neutral arbiter balancing different stakeholders’ concerns by 
relying on “factual” CoSP data as the basis for making decisions. Ideally, pricing decisions were 
achieved through reasoned deliberation and consensus. Finally, during evaluation, the entire process 
was retrospectively examined. If the process of decision-making as a whole was to be legitimate for 
internal participants and external observers, all these steps had to be seen as fair as possible and in-
clude the representation of multiple voices. 
When the ethnographer expressed her interest in studying price setting, she was informed that it 
was a highly “technical” process. In practice, however, setting fair prices involved ethical dilemmas 
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that could not be simply calculated away. It was not always clear how to interpret CoSP, given geo-
graphical differences between production sites, producer capabilities, wage levels, currency fluctua-
tions and climate affecting commodity yields. Parties had to continually cope with these challenges in 
making decisions about a fair minimum price. These required repeated cycles of price research, con-
sultation rounds and deliberations to reach a decision that was often based on an acceptable compro-
mise, rather than full consensus, often under pressure to make a decision rather than none. 
Ethical complexity across three pricing projects 
We focus on three FTMP setting projects: coffee, cotton and rooibos. These represent major price 
setting projects during the ethnography. Their study allowed us to closely observe how the final deci-
sion was negotiated by the Standards Committee. Over time, it became apparent that each project in-
volved novel challenges that were not readily resolvable through pre-defined price setting frame-
works. Projects varied highly in their start date, length, number of affected parties and work intensity. 
What they all shared was high complexity and conflict between parties with competing interpretations 
of the situation. Table 1 details the dimensions and outcomes of the three price-setting projects.  
-------------------------Insert Table 1 --------------------------- 
The coffee price project, dealing with Fairtrade’s flagship product and affecting an estimated 
700,000 small coffee farmers, was the most resource-intensive project lasting over a year. It revealed 
the political dynamics involved in what was ostensibly a technical process of calculating fair prices. 
The outcome was a small but controversial increase by five US cents that remained significantly be-
low an inflation-adjusted value of the original FTMP set in 1988/9. Nevertheless, the decision to in-
crease the price created a rift in Fairtrade, and contributed to Fairtrade USA later leaving the associa-
tion. The cotton price project was revelatory because it involved a breach of shared norms of decision-
making, and revealed the role of intuitive moral judgment. An “emergency” price decision, reached 
within less than one month, was deemed “illegitimate” because it failed to follow the due, if lengthy 
processes of price research and public consultation. Finally, the rooibos price project involved few 
producers in South Africa, but lasted almost three years due to the inability of parties to reach an 
agreement. Challenges included dealing with historical legacies from South Africa’s apartheid past, 
and arbitrating between producers with radically different resources, needs and capabilities. All three 
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cases involved ethical dilemmas, where no meta-rule could be readily applied. They revealed how par-
ties constructed the meaning of fairness against contradictory demands and conflicting criteria. 
Data collection 
Data were collected from three primary sources: (1) a six-month ethnographic study of organizational 
life at Fairtrade, (2) 39 open-ended, in-depth interviews with Fairtrade staff members and external 
stakeholders; and (3) documentation.  
Ethnographic observation. Following Becker and Geer’s (1957, p. 322) suggestion to participate 
in the “daily life of people” and learn “the native language” of the social setting, one author gained ac-
cess to the “backstage” world of negotiations on fair prices. She conducted 1,100 hours of ethnograph-
ic observation at Fairtrade’s Standards Unit between July and December 2007. Observations covered 
the everyday work of a Standards Officer, including desk work, office talk, and informal conversa-
tions in hallways and during coffee and lunch-breaks. She assisted staff members with ongoing price 
setting projects, specifically, rooibos, coffee and cotton. She helped in CoSP data analysis, stakeholder 
consultation and drafting of price proposals. She also participated in numerous team meetings and all 
three two-day Standards Committee meetings where the FTMPs for rooibos, coffee and cotton were 
negotiated and set. Participation in these discussions allowed her to experience the ethical complexity 
involved in price setting. She recorded detailed observations in a field diary which amounted to 400 
pages, and wrote analytic memos to reflect on emerging themes. 
Interviews. While short, sporadic interviews were conducted alongside daily observations, formal 
interviews were conducted to follow up on and refine emerging themes. At the end of the ethnograph-
ic observation, 26 interviews were conducted. For each of the three pricing projects, the lead project 
manager was interviewed. As staff typically worked across projects, all Standards Unit staff, Producer 
Liaison staff, Standards Committee members, three staff from Alternative Trade Organizations 
(ATOs) and an external consultant were interviewed to reflect on each project. The open-ended inter-
views lasted 30-120 minutes and focused on the aims of FTMP, the organizational process of price 
setting, and the challenges encountered. We conducted nine follow up interviews with Fairtrade staff, 
ATOs and sustainability standards experts. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
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Documentary sources. We collected documents for each pricing project. This included emails, 
presentations, briefing papers, price proposals, stakeholder consultations, minutes of meetings, and 
press releases. We had access to proprietary documents such as extended minutes, internal letters, and 
draft standards documents that allowed validating observation and interview-based impressions. 
Data Analysis 
 Our analytical approach was open-ended and inductive (Corbin and Strauss 2008). As common in 
ethnographic research, our analysis started when observation began. The ethnographer wrote weekly 
analytical memos about emergent issues and themes. While ethnographers need to balance an ethno-
graphic self with an analytical standpoint, the shift from being an outsider to an insider immersed into 
the setting was vital to appreciating the “excruciating difficulty” (Bauman 1993, p. 248) of being fair 
and witnessing first-hand how organizational members wrestled with this task. Two issues stood out. 
First, she observed overwhelming complexity in deciding on a fair price. Second, she noted that being 
“fair” meant providing following certain principles of argumentation, rather than subjective judg-
ments. The tension was reflected in memos headings such as “impartial vs. political” and “rational vs 
irrational.” There was a stark contrast between the formalized procedures to guarantee impartial and 
disinterested decisions and the situational messiness that required moral and political judgments.  
In the first stage of analysis, we imported all data into an integrated database and used qualitative 
analysis software, NVivo to develop, refine, and organize emerging codes. To balance intimacy and 
distancing with the local setting, both authors, one less familiar with the setting, independently coded 
the data and compared emerging themes.We began by creating chronological case histories (Van de 
Ven and Poole 2002) for the three price projects, rooibos, coffee and cotton. Figure 1 illustrates the 
different timelines for each project, indicating formal occasions for stakeholder deliberation as “SC 
dialogue.” In parallel, we developed tables of observed events and emerging themes.  
----------------------Insert Figure 1------------------------ 
The development of chronologies revealed the ongoing struggles of participants as they attempted 
to make collective sense of ethical complexity and establish a common position. We noted that stake-
holder processes were organized around certain judgment criteria that deliberants followed to render 
their arguments fair and valid. In an iterative process, we sought theoretical approaches to structure 
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our analysis. Deliberative democracy (Habermas 1996) was particularly valuable in conceptualizing 
specific principles constituting the “rules of the discourse.” We also identified breach of rules that 
triggered debate and prompted actors to articulate their implicit assumptions. Breaches can help dis-
cover social order through its disruption because unexpected violations reveal the “background expec-
tancies” governing social interactions (Goffman 1971). For instance, when minor breaches occurred in 
Standards Committee meetings, participants would reprimand dissidents to return to a “rational,” ra-
ther than “irrational” or “emotional” modes of discussion. The cotton project revealed a major breach 
and the final price decision was criticized as illegitimate for having violated accepted norms of the de-
liberative process. We created a list of rules and breaching instances and coded them.  
Our coding generated eight preliminary mechanisms through which deliberants established a joint 
position on prices. We termed them sensemaking mechanisms because they helped “people organize 
to make sense of equivocal inputs and enact this sense back into the world to make that world more 
orderly” (Weick et al. 2005: 410). Mechanisms reside at a level of analysis above description and be-
low universal laws and serve as theoretical explanations for observed phenomenon (Davis and Mar-
quis 2005; Gross 2009; Weber 2006). Iterating between data and theory, we identified commonalities 
and collapsed them into five more generic mechanisms. We identified three of these mechanisms as 
related to principles used in the dialogue: decentering for making impartial decisions (impartiality), 
formatting for establishing objective facts (factuality), and proceduralizing for achieving replicable 
processes (replicability). To illustrate, we identified deliberants concern about being fair to everyone 
as decentering, in line with Habermas’ notion of impartiality as a necessary condition for universaliz-
ing arguments. The analysis of breaches revealed that, in many instances, actors were unable to elimi-
nate complexity or reach a consensus. We found that each mechanism was thwarted by situational 
contingencies that required accommodating idiosyncratic challenges. We tracked how different con-
tingencies were articulated and whether and how they were addressed. Table 2 illustrates the situa-
tional contingencies that emerged in each case. 
-----------------------Insert Table 2 ------------------------- 
Finally, our second order themes suggested an ongoing tension between universalizable reason and 
contextual judgments in coping with emergent contingencies. By comparing projects, we sought pat-
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terns in how actors coped with the tension and reached closure on ethical issues. Over recurrent cycles 
of deliberation, actors dealt with contingencies by categorizing them as either fundamental or context-
specific. We labeled the two mechanisms dealing with these contingencies as suspending intractables 
and exceptionalizing. We noted that these outcomes of ethical sensemaking processes represented 
“temporary resting points” (Weick 2012, p. 150), which enabled reaching an ethical truce even if 
some suspended issues led to renewed deliberations. See Figure 2 for our final data structure. Finally, 
we linked the mechanisms that emerged from our analysis into an overall theoretical model. 
----------------------------Insert Figure 2-------------------------------- 
FINDINGS: MAKING SENSE OF WHAT IS ETHICAL 
Consensual Decision-Making under Ethical Complexity  
The ethical complexity in Fairtrade Minimum Price projects problematized what fair meant in a given 
situation. Despite a shared definition of a fair price as covering producers’ costs of sustainable produc-
tion (CoSP), what “fair” meant was less obvious. A Producer Consultant acknowledged: 
What is fair? To begin with “fair” is a subjective concept; it is dependent on a subjective perspec-
tive. Everybody perceives “fairness” differently, on an individual level. Therefore it is about un-
derstanding what “fair” means. We always say that the FTMP should cover the so-called cost of 
sustainable production. But what are production costs? Ultimately, production costs, if you want to 
determine them for a specific group of producers, are just approximations! 
 
This quote describes the tension between individual perceptions of fairness and the general principle 
of CoSP. When trying to define a fair price, actors often confronted novel challenges. While “you can 
try to capture it [the notion of fairness in price setting] with a few basic principles,” as a Standards 
Manager explained, “when you get to the detail the whole thing is much more complicated.”   
Stakeholder deliberation did not resolve ethical complexity. Rather, as a Pricing Officer acknowl-
edged; “making the compromise between all the different stakeholders is a difficult job, because eve-
ryone has a different set of priorities.” Yet, Fairtrade needed to bring these complexities to a provi-
sional closure. Fairtrade’s organizational legitimacy depended on its ability to facilitate stakeholder 
consensus on “fair” pricing decision to yield Fairtrade Minimum Prices. Yet, for Fairtrade to be seen 
as “fair,” the process of decision making had to be considered legitimate by participants. According to 
the Standards Director, the challenge was to move from people’s subjective viewpoints to an intersub-
jective position that would allow a fair and balanced outcome: 
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The challenge is how to bring these different, let me call it perception and values perspectives of 
different people, or more pragmatically, their various interested points of views into a reasonable 
consensus, and that is highly difficult because so many people join the conversation. It is a huge 
challenge to get to a balanced outcome.   
 
Given these challenges, a Standards Officer described her work as one of coping with dilemmas. 
You are constantly confronted with some dilemma, all the time! Mostly it is a real dilemma and the 
right solution just doesn’t exist. rooibos is such a classical dilemma!” 
 
 Direct participation in price negotiations revealed the situated ethical dilemmas that appear in action-
contexts, and how they challenged actors to “make something meaningful out of a mess!” as a Pricing 
Officer put it. Parties struggled to reconcile the need to make valid arguments that transcended situa-
tional particularities and accommodate emergent contingencies. 
Ethical dilemmas in setting a Fairtrade Minimum Price for Rooibos  
 
For reasons of space, we use the illustrative example of rooibos to convey ethical complexity in-
volved in prices setting. While present in all three cases, the rooibos case was particularly suitable for 
observing the intractable nature of situational contingencies. It shows not just conflicting values and 
interests but also how historical injustices in post-apartheid South Africa led to stark differences in 
producer groups. Poor, black smallholder farmers grow wild rooibos on infertile land competed with 
affluent, white plantation owners with privileged access to fertile land. Amid sharp disagreements, the 
rooibos project lasted almost three years. The outcome was a price about 1/3 below the CoSP of 
Fairtrade’s key constituency; marginalized, smallholder farmers lacking access to conventional mar-
kets. This contrasted with Fairtrade’s official press release announcing the new FTMP for rooibos tea: 
Fairtrade International is confident that this initiative coincides with the core values of the 
Fairtrade Labelling System to guarantee producers a fair and stable price that covers their cost of 
sustainable production (CoSP) (FLO 2007) 
 
While for some, the price was still too low; for others it was seen to subsidize small farmer inefficien-
cies. Below, we explore how multi-stakeholder deliberations led to this outcome.  
David versus Goliath: Fairtrade certified rooibos has been celebrated as a role model for black 
community empowerment in post-apartheid South Africa. In late 1990s, two smallholder cooperatives, 
Wupperthal and Heiveld, producing organic rooibos – an indigenous herb – were founded with the as-
sistance of government, local NGOs and Western alternative trading organizations (ATOs) such as 
Equal Exchange. The aim was to empower marginalized communities in remote semi-arid mountain 
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plateaus in the Western and Northern Cape.i ATO trading partnerships and Fairtrade certifications es-
tablished in 2003 (Wupperthal) and 2005 (Heiveld), enabled farmers to penetrate Northern markets 
and achieve prices for rooibos that were well above conventional market prices.  
Initially, there was no need for a FTMP. The Fairtrade market for rooibos consisted of ATO buyers 
directly negotiating fair prices with the two cooperatives. From 2005 onwards, increasing demand for 
Fairtrade certified products in consumer markets attracted commercial traders, who sourced conven-
tionally grown rooibos from Fairtrade certified plantations at “competitive” prices below the cost-
covering base of smallholder farmers. When the market price for rooibos declined sharply due to rec-
ord harvests and over-supply; ATOs sought Fairtrade’s intervention in setting fair prices for small 
farmers, fearing that they would otherwise be “priced out” of the Fairtrade market.  
Price setting process – Making meaning out of a mess: The price setting process included two 
rounds of price researches, three stakeholder consultations and a workshop in South Africa with repre-
sentatives from both “Small Farmers’ Organizations” and plantations employing “Hired Labour”. 
While the average CoSP was meant to provide a fair and “simple way of calculating” the FTMP, as a 
Pricing Officer explained, the notions of average and sustainable offered a significant degree of inter-
pretative flexibility. Price research “flagged up,” as respondents put it, significant differences in CoSP 
between types of producers. This problematized taking the average as a reference point. The CoSP re-
ported by large plantations was less than half the CoSP reported by small producer cooperatives. The 
average CoSP would not cover the costs of smallholder farmers, while it would exceed the cost of 
large plantations. The notion of average was based on the moral mandate “that all certified parties 
should be treated equally” without privileging any region or type of producer. However, it also meant 
that the varying needs of different people had to be translated into a generalized representation of the 
“average” producer. What did average mean in the case of radical inequalities, such as when histori-
cally disadvantaged black smallholders in remote, unfertile areas competed with white-owned mecha-
nized plantations in post-apartheid South Africa?  
Consultation rounds revealed sharp differences among stakeholders. Eager to grow their Fairtrade 
market share, plantation owners and their buyers strongly resisted any proposal to set a FTMP that ex-
ceeded their costs. However, their arguments were couched in technical terms. According to them, 
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small farmers were simply inefficient. And Fairtrade should not subsidize inefficiencies and “lock 
famers into unsustainable ways of production.” ATOs, the main buyers of small farmers’ rooibos, in 
contrast, passionately defended the case of their suppliers, with whom they had developed strong ties 
over time. They opposed the idea that Fairtrade had to be neutral towards all types of producers. To 
defend their position, they invoked the foundational ethos of Fairtrade as a trading partnership with 
smallholder cooperatives. Moreover, supporting plantations was seen to perpetuate apartheid legacies. 
An ATO representative in a stakeholder consultation noted: 
This reason is not justified to let enter in the system the main enemy of the blacks and colored 
iipeople that have suffered from the whites during apartheid. Fair trade has to bring down 
previously unfair situations! 
 
ATOs thus demanded that plantations be excluded from Fairtrade markets. At the minimum, the 
Fairtrade minimum price should be set at the level of small farmers’ CoSP.  
In adjudicating these claims, the Standards Unit, that saw itself as “the guardian of the whole pro-
cess,” sought to ensure that pricing decisions were impartially derived through proper procedures. For 
example, a Standards Unit officer criticized ATO comments in rooibos price consultation, noting that 
“they got really emotional, you know.” ATO’s “passionate support” for smallholder farmers was seen 
as “behind-the-scenes lobbying,” which could “distort recommendations” and disrupt “objective” pro-
cesses, which required detachment to achieve fair prices. “We try to keep this [“lobby politics”] out of 
the processes as far as possible,” the Standards Unit manager emphasized. Nevertheless, Fairtrade 
members had to make sense of the difference in CoSP. A key debate in Standards Committee (SC) 
meetings was whether small farmers were simply inefficient or whether low costs indicated low pay 
and exploitative labour conditions, as this exchange about CoSP data shows.  
SC Member [independent expert]: The researcher doesn’t understand the system [questioning re-
search that reports low CoSP for plantations]. Are the low costs based on low labour costs? Are 
they [plantations] more efficient or are they not paying their workers? If they are exploitative then 
[Fairtrade] prices should go up to ensure they pay their workers decently. But if small farmers 
aren’t efficient, then we have to think about what is the long term perspective for the small farm-
ers? If they have no hope to compete with Hired Labour. There is no rationale for where we go. 
This isn’t an adequate piece of research. I’m unhappy to make a decision. It’s poor analysis.  
 
Standards Officer: It’s apparent that there’s a heavy bias, but it’s not possible to eliminate it as far 
as we see. We commented on the first questionnaire. Questions were framed in a certain way. The 
problem with small farmers is that they don’t diversify crops, efficiency is the key factor. Labour 
conditions are being checked. Our recommendation is to look at the issue of efficiency.  
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This exchange illustrates the ambiguity involved in defining CoSP based on “sound analysis” and 
“objective facts.” Moreover, even if plantations were more efficient, questions were raised whether 
this was merely the result of historical injustices. Some argued that the racially segregated rooibos 
production reflected the apartheid legacies of South Africa. Plantations were typically owned by “rich 
white” farmers with access to the most fertile land. This allowed them to cultivate rooibos “on the 
side” in crop rotations cycles, and cross-subsidize it by producing more lucrative products, such as cit-
rus fruits and wine grapes. “Poor black” small farmers, in contrast, struggled to make a living on arid, 
mountainous land. Under colonial and apartheid regimes, they were relocated to the outer reaches of 
the provinces and lacked access to fertile land. They relied on wild rooibos and could not diversify 
beyond this resilient crop that survived the toughest conditions.  
The issue of land use also put in doubt what sustainable meant in environmental terms. With an in-
crease in extreme weather and drought threatening South African agriculture, this issue became criti-
cal. In consultations, ATOs argued that wild-harvested rooibos farming was costlier but reflected nat-
ural resource management that kept biodiversity intact and minimized water use. Cheaper mono-
cultures used by large plantations risked soil damage and loss of biodiversity. A buyer from a French 
ATO, Les Jardins de Gaia, which had supported the Heiveld cooperative since early 2000s, noted:  
I really fight to sell the small farmers’ products. The big enterprises destroy both the soil and small 
farming activities. We buyers have to lead in showing the difference between the products of big 
businesses and the small farmers who care about biodiversity (quoted in The Guardian, 2010). 
 
Given the ambiguity surrounding the “true” costs of sustainable production, it was a huge challenge to 
agree on one fair price for smallholder farmers and large plantations. 
Is rooibos a tea or herb? Suspending the political question: The question whether smallholder 
cooperatives deserved preferential access to Fairtrade markets was underpinned by the highly conten-
tious debate on the role of plantations in the Fairtrade model. In coffee, this dispute led Trans-Fair 
USA to split from Fairtrade International in 2011. At the SC Meeting in November 2007, the ATO 
and the African producer representative, advocated excluding large-scale plantations from the 
Fairtrade market in favour of small farmers. The two representatives from labeling initiatives objected. 
Limiting supply to smallholders would stifle Fairtrade market opportunities and eliminate benefits for 
farm workers employed by plantations. They framed their arguments in terms of “general interest” – 
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Fairtrade certification would improve labour conditions. Small farmers at least owned a plot of land, 
and were better off than poor, landless workers. An ATO member rejected this reasoning as still moti-
vated by “volume growth rather than the underlying needs of the farmers” and being “a commercial 
choice to get growth at any cost.” As discussions did not yield an agreement, deliberants shifted the 
debate to the technical categorization of rooibos as either tea or herb. The African producer repre-
sentative argued that rooibos should be moved into the “herb” category, which was limited to small 
farmers only, rather than the “tea” category, which was also open to plantations.iii 
SC Member [Producer Africa]: I read that rooibos is not a tea plant; it says it is a herbal infusion. 
It belongs to spices and herbs, perhaps. It’s in the wrong standard.  
SC Member [ATO]: I’d like to recommend that it be transferred to the herbs and spices standard. 
 
SC Member [Producer Latin America]:  I would support [ATO]’s comments that the [discussion] 
paper is not convincing about need to open to more Hired Labour situations. If the question is the 
scope we should look at the possibility to close it to Hired Labour.  
 
Rather than risk invoking loyalties or emotions by questioning who deserves or needs preferential 
treatment, this exchange shows how deliberants invoked what was considered objective reasoning. 
Parties were acutely aware that a judgment based on emotions would not be seen as legitimate reason-
ing. They sought to resolve the debate through the seemingly neutral and “technical” exercise of clas-
sifying rooibos into the correct product category. According to a discussion paper that was circulated, 
the botanical definition placed rooibos in the family of Leguminosae. Rooibos was a herbal infusion 
such as hibiscus, camomile and mint. In contrast, tea belonged to the botanical family of Theaceae. 
However, Fairtrade had categorized all herbal infusions by their use as “tea” in the Tea Standard. Was 
an exception for rooibos justifiable? To bring the debate to a closure, the Committee Chair suggested 
“We don’t have consensus so we should vote.” Committee members decided by majority vote that 
rooibos should remain in the tea category, thus enabling the inclusion of large plantations. 
Making an exception: A special pricing formula: During price setting, parties agreed that the his-
torical and structural differences between the two types of producers – small farmers and large planta-
tions – could not simply be “calculated away.” An average price would not cover smallholder CoSP, 
but exceed plantations’ CoSP. The excess value was likely to benefit (“rich white”) plantation owners 
who, as an ATO trader noted, would “meet with you in their expensive luxury cars,” rather than 
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(“poor black”) workers. A pricing officer described the situation as an “ethical dilemma because it is 
about balancing the rights of different actors.” Parties recognized the methodological limits of deter-
mining prices objectively: “You need to recognize that you have huge latitude with regards to the 
number that comes out at the end,” the Standards Director stated. He added: 
So we need to be responsible and say ‘So these are the numbers, and what does common sense tell 
us? What do other people tell us? What about non-quantifiable impacts that we know they exist? 
And what do we do with the data?’ That is part of the game. 
 
Seeking to accommodate case particularities, the Standards Unit developed a “special pricing for-
mula” that reflected differences in CoSP. After debating various options, the final proposal was to let 
small farmers and large plantations “trade on the same price” (35 South African Rand (ZAR)/kg), but 
differentiate on price components. Small farmers would be guaranteed a higher minimum price but 
lower premium (30 + 5 ZAR/kg). Plantations would receive a lower minimum price but higher premi-
um (23 + 12 ZAR/kg) earmarked for workers and the local community. Smallholders, in contrast, 
would be encouraged to “invest the money sensibly” in efficiency improvements. However, the total 
price was still below their CoSP. 
When the Standards Unit presented the pricing model at the SC meeting in November 2007, they 
described it as a “middle ground between CoSPs of Hired Labour and Small Farmers. We decided to 
make a compromise.” Discussions revealed enduring disunity among stakeholders. While the ATO 
representative, disputed the proposed price as being too low, other committee members regarded it as 
too high. “We are now looking at a minimum that is less than what Small Farmers are getting and 
double what the Hired Labour [large plantations] claim they need. Why is that a good solution?” the 
Committee Chair asked provocatively. Even though the rooibos case was acknowledged to be “emo-
tionally and politically charged” (SC member), deliberants reminded each other that the role of the 
committee was to make rational decisions based on facts. A Committee member asked: “do we make 
decisions based on an emotional and political factors or a systematic process?” Urging other members 
to return to being impartial, the Standards Director emphasized the importance of creating a “level 
playing field.” He also invoked urgency to encourage a decision, arguing that “the season starts now 
in rooibos. If we don’t want to miss the whole harvest [then] we cannot delay this too much.”  
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Despite a lengthy deliberative process, parties could not unanimously agree. They acknowledged 
that “we are not going to satisfy everybody’s definition of fair price,” a Standards Officer observed. A 
Labeling Initiative representative made a conciliatory move when commenting on the price proposal:  
I am happy with the reasoning. I think it is creative and solves the basic problems. The reasoning 
of some traders to say that prices should be set to maximize sales – that is not Fairtrade! But I am 
not convinced either that we should take the costs of small producers as the reference. I have a 
feeling that the outcome is one that I could support. 
 
Others agreed, though were hesitant: “I don’t see another option,” and “in the context I think it is 
the best solution.” The pricing formula passed, not by consensus, but by narrow majority vote. An SC 
member later rationalized the outcome as a truce, where “in the end no one is happy” but “you met in 
the middle.” The truce was celebrated as an achievement because it balanced conflicting viewpoints 
and “ensured that small farmers and plantations have the same market access opportunities for their 
rooibos tea.” While some still doubted the fairness of the decision, they nevertheless compromised for 
achieving an agreement after protracted deliberations. 
A MODEL OF ETHICS AS SENSEMAKING 
How did Fairtrade actors make judgements amid considerable ethical ambiguity? How was an ac-
ceptable pricing decision reached that all participants saw as “fair”? Through analysing our data 
across the three price projects, we sought an explanation of how actors made sense of what is ethical 
and reached a provisional truce. This is captured by a model, which we develop in two parts. First, we 
explain mechanisms through which participants make sense of ethical complexity. Second, we explain 
how deliberants reach temporary resting points. Cycling through rounds of sensemaking enables par-
ticipants to reach an ethical truce.  
Part 1: Making sense of the tension between universality and particularity in setting fair prices 
Our fieldwork in three Fairtrade Minimum Price projects revealed formidable challenges in setting 
“global standards of fairness” (FLO 2008). Our analysis indicates that reaching consensus on conten-
tious ethical issues involved a two-fold challenge. On the one hand, the decision-making process had 
to be seen as objective, replicable and impartial so that Fairtrade could claim being “fair” across vari-
ous price setting projects. During deliberations, interlocutors had to make morally “valid” arguments 
that could lay claim to universalizable reason as opposed to reflecting parochial opinions. In negotia-
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tions over prices, the “rationale” behind a particular argument had to be accepted both by parties in the 
dialogue (internal validity) and be justifiable to external parties (external validity) such as buyers of 
Fairtrade certified products. Standards Committee (SC) members would accuse each other as being 
“irrational” or “emotional” when someone’s moral claims were put forward as a mere “opinion” and 
lacked grounding in sound, objective and defensible reasoning. Similarly, SC member frequently 
noted how “irrational decisions” put “our credibility and reputation at risk.” The Standards Director 
explained the concern about justifying pricing decisions to external audiences: “Because of our 
accountability, we have to make sure that we put our decisions on solid grounding.” On the other 
hand, being “fair” also challenged Fairtrade staff to consider and, at times, accommodate the particu-
larities of concrete situations not amenable to universalizable standards of fairness. Each situation was 
unique, and revealed new, ambiguous, unsettled, or unresolved ethical questions. A Pricing Officer 
described her experience: “When I wasn’t in Fairtrade yet, I thought the minimum price was a good 
idea, and that it was simple […] but then…there are so many different things, which you cannot know 
in advance.” Judgments often had to be made under considerable ambiguity, uncertainty, and conflict, 
with multiple parties competing over different interpretations and courses of action.  
Emergent contingencies required deliberants to exercise contextual judgments within the general 
framework for decision-making. We refer to ongoing iteration between universalizable reason and 
contextual judgment as “ethics as sensemaking.” Excessive universalizing risked bureaucratization, 
depersonalization and disregard of the particular. Excessive particularizing risked partisanship, arbi-
trariness and ad-hocism that could compromise the deliberative process. To reach a shared position, 
Fairtrade continually balanced universalizable reason and contextual judgement. Figure 3 depicts this 
ongoing tension. In the three pricing projects, we identified three distinct, yet interrelated sensemaking 
mechanisms through which participants in the dialogue established valid arguments and abstracted 
from ethical complexity: formatting; proceduralizing and de-centering. These were geared towards 
the universal principles of factuality, replicability and impartiality. Through these processes, deliber-
ants sought to transcend the particularities of individual cases, while continually challenged by defini-
tional ambiguities, local exigencies and social attachments that required contextual judgements. 
------------------------Insert Figure 3 about here------------------------ 
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Formatting: Across all three price projects, we observed that participants tried to ground their rea-
soning in more generalizable formats and schemas that were potentially applicable across individual 
cases. Formatting involves converting idiosyncratic aspects of a complex ethical issue into a common 
metric and was achieved through using a technical methodology of calculating the average Cost of 
Sustainable Production (CoSP), as defined in Fairtrade’s Standard Operating Procedure. CoSP meth-
odology had a dual purpose. On the one hand, it provided parties a common “official” language that 
all understand and served as a sensemaking device to guide deliberations. CoSP provided, at least in 
theory, a “simple way of calculating” the FTMP. Grounding disparate qualitative information about 
individual producers in recognizable, objective formats could reduce complexity and enable what ap-
peared to be a more rational dialogue. A Standards officer emphasized: 
We need to collect as many facts as we can…ok, we will never have a perfect price, even if we 
have thousands of observations, but still, having there the information helps people to make a deci-
sion at another level, at the SC [Standards Committee], to make informed decisions and that is 
backed up by all the charts that we provide…we are trying very hard to us to be based on facts and 
information, and facts that mean numbers, and information means factual information, such as the 
impact of a certain price on market demand?  
 
On the other hand, formatting through CoSP allowed parties to increase the moral validity of their 
reasoning by providing an objective justification. This explains Fairtrade’s concern to show that a 
FTMP was not a politically motivated outcome (even though respondents noted that “there is plenty of 
politics in the Standards Committee”) but rather a function of technical CoSP calculations. A Stand-
ards Officer explained the importance of factual evidence to justify price decisions: 
The best decision, or the right decision, when you act under uncertainty, […] it means having done 
really good research to back up the decision you make, and it's also the difference between a high 
quality, well-researched decision that is based on facts, research, knowledge versus a political deci-
sion based on kinds of passion and concerns of strong concerns of different actors.  
 
Political confrontations were often tamed by reference to CoSP as an objective arbiter of ethics that 
left participants with little choice but to agree with a “technically correct” figure. Formatting trans-
forms qualitative differences into a comparable common metric or generalizable representation (Es-
peland and Stevens 1998). It takes advantage of the “naturalizing power of numbers and calculative 
procedures” to mask normative choices and subjective judgments with the “putative objectivity of 
computations” (Meyer and Hollerer 2010, p. 1258) and develop factual “truth” through a reliance on 
numbers and rigorous methodologies (Porter 1996). The figures, numbers and methodologies do not 
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represent factual “truth” but formatting serves as a tool to construct an intersubjective sense of factual-
ity and facilitate the emergence of a consensus.  
Proceduralizing: Valid reasoning involves systematic procedures that ensure consistency and rep-
licability in decision making. In our case, proceduralizing was meant to structure decision processes 
and ensure access to democratic participation, transparent decision making, and consistency among 
pricing projects. A pricing officer explained; “this is our obligation towards producers, participants in 
the trade and members of our own organization to maintain transparent processes and practice 
democratic decision-making.” Standard Operating Procedures were instituted across all steps of price 
setting; problem recognition, research; consultation, deliberation and decision evaluation. These pro-
cedures regulated decision making by imposing a check on subjectivity and discretionary adjustments 
and reduce the effect of personal biases or preferences. As a process, deciding on what was fair be-
came “manageable, calculable and predictable” in the words of a Producer Consultant. 
Proceduralizing involves being systematic to ensure consistent treatment. In the cotton price pro-
ject, the importance of procedures was highlighted by a breach in accepted procedures. Fairtrade staff 
was outraged when a Standards Committee member managed to push through an “ad hoc” rise of the 
FTMP following a field visit to India. Fairtrade staff was outraged: “FLO has to be consistent and 
cannot say ‘yes’ to some and ‘no’ to others when the cases are equal.” Following procedures systemat-
ically ensured that every stakeholder was treated equally, and that their concerns were given equal 
weight. A Producer Consultant responsible for India condemned the “quick fix” because she had wit-
nessed many urgent cases in her everyday activities: “What ...these guys saw, once (!), is what we see 
every day! And it's all urgent to us!” She argued: 
The way we deal with it is that we have to become systematic!!![…] So we have to become ration-
al, or we just become ad-hoc and absolutely useless to the producer because we are supposed to be 
business consultants. So we have to put our business consulting hat on. We still feel very passion-
ate and want everything to be done […] But we also have to face the producers and we have to be 
fair to everyone, and we have to rationalise out where we can help them, and where we know we 
have to feed into a larger process, prioritise what is urgent, what is not urgent. 
 
Being systematic was seen as being fair to everyone because it regulated decision making by im-
posing a check on subjectivity and arbitrary adjustments. Proceduralization is a technique to design, 
regulate and govern ethical complexity through creating “fair bargaining processes” (Habermas 
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1996a, p. 24) to contain the chaos of fragmentation. For example, producers were aggregated into a 
generalized representation of the “average” producer. Representing individual stakeholders in terms of 
abstract categories such as “producers” or “traders” facilitated systematic comparisons and enabled 
agreements. Proceduralizing can thus filter relevant information from the messy contextual knowledge 
and create a proceduralized context that can orient deliberants towards shared understandings.  
Decentering: In addition to the pressures to be “fair to everyone,” we observed that the validity of 
arguments was also based on participants’ ability to transcend their subjective positions and detach 
themselves from personal attachments to reach intersubjective meaning. For instance, the Standards 
Committee saw its role as one seeking common ground amid diverse perspectives and making neutral 
decisions. A committee member explained that all participants had individual interests, but were ex-
pected to transcend their parochial interests through deliberations and take a generalized viewpoint:  
We come there as individuals from different stakeholder groups…But I’m certainly not represent-
ing the LIs [Labeling Initiative’s] viewpoint…We have some kind of middleman position where 
we need to understand and recognize everybody’s concerns. 
 
To make their arguments valid, deliberants needed to show dispassionate reasoning and impartiali-
ty weighing “a comment from stakeholder 1 as much as a comment from stakeholder 2.” Failure to 
decenter and transcend individual or group interest could be seen as “being irrational,” “politically 
motivated” or “acting emotionally.” A Standards Officer noted the need for neutralilty. 
It is important as an individual not to become too close to any particular stakeholder in the system. 
I can certainly see everyone at Fairtrade needs to appear quite neutral and not allow himself to be-
come overly involved with the needs of certain stakeholders. Maintaining that balance is key.  
 
As evident in the discussion on whether rooibos was tea or herb, deliberants couched their 
arguments in “technical” and “neutral” terms in order to demonstrate their impartiality and that they 
acted in the general interest, and not in their narrow individual or group interest. Similarly, allowing 
emotions to come in would impede actors’ ability to see the situation in a “detached” way. Criticizing 
the “ad hoc” adjustment of the cotton price, an interviewee argued that impartial moral judgments 
required detachment from social relationships and emotional attachments to particular producers: 
I have 100 producer groups [Fairtrade Asia] between my colleagues in Africa and Latin America 
we’ve got 600! So we cover nearly 600 producers, who we meet, who we have personal relation-
ships with. I have people in producer groups calling my Liaison Officers when they have cancer or 
when they have grief or whatever, because of the kind of relationships you are building, you build 
friendships…But in the end, we have to be neutral! 
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Decentering was important for judging the legitimacy of a pricing decision during retrospective evalu-
ation of the process. The Standards Director noted that the lack of satisfaction from any particular 
stakeholder group was evidence that the outcome represented a “fair” middle ground:  
It would be a poor decision if we got applause from one side, but got boos from the other side. Be-
cause then it’s likely that the balance of stakeholder interests would not be guaranteed […] If no-
body was satisfied but all say ‘hmm, ok,’ then it probably was a good decision.  
 
Learning to view arguments from the others’ stance involves transcending the myopia of individual 
viewpoints to achieve an “expanded” perspective (Habermas, 1996). Participants “decenter” their par-
tisan perspectives to enable the emergence of shared meaning on disputed matters. 
Bracketing situational contingencies: Formatting, proceduralizing and decentering were meant to 
make sense of ethical complexity and enable intersubjective agreement. Paradoxically, however, sub-
stantive questions did not disappear, but re-surfaced in conflicts around, over, and within these ab-
straction processes. This led to sensebreaking or the “breaking down of meaning” (Pratt, 2000, p. 
464). Instead of reducing complexity, efforts to format, proceduralize and decenter opened up more 
questions that became events for further sensemaking. Respondents used the term “flag up” to refer to 
marking issues for closer attention. As Weick et al. (2005) put it, they “bracketed” cues about inter-
rupted situations, such as “flagging up the issue of cotton prices in India” (Standards Officer). 
First, while a universal standard of reference was meant to be an objective judgment device that 
enabled transforming idiosyncratic issues into a generalizable format, in practice formatting involved 
contextual moral judgments and political decisions. CoSP methodology had to be interpreted in spe-
cific contexts, which revealed definitional ambiguities. A Standards Officer noted its limits: 
It’s not like you can just simply apply the [CoSP] methodology, it always depends on how you 
evaluate the specific situation. I mean which criteria do we use? When do we have the feeling that 
we have enough information to take a decision? And how can we be sure at all that this is the right 
decision? It’s a really difficult decision making process and you cannot capture that with any 
methodology. It’s about how do you deal with the information? What is good CoSP data?  
 
What counted as “facts” was itself the outcome of political contestation, such as the meaning of 
sustainable and average, which could each significantly inflate or deflate CoSP. The case of rooibos 
showed how CoSP varied among different types of farmers even within the same country. In coffee, 
parties struggled to accurately compare the CoSP across over 700,000 farmers and families in over 27 
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countries and make sense of how to calculate the cost of “family labour” in rural farming, or to deal 
with currency fluctuations. External influences such as weather events could also radically affect the 
calculation of costs and yields. A Standards Manager explained the limits of formatting: 
We try to get the CoSP, but in the end there will be limits to the facts because you know that num-
bers don’t reflect reality. We can’t collect complete data. And you can debate endlessly how a cer-
tain issue should be measured, what costs should be counted and so on. There are huge areas of 
definitional questions. So eventually you shouldn’t exaggerate the role of data and the scientific 
basis…As to what concerns reality, that can deviate to a relatively large extent. So we need to say 
“So these are the numbers, and what does common sense tell us? What do other people tell us? 
What about non-quantifiable impacts that we know they exist? That is part of the game.”  
 
Thus, despite the technically sophisticated approach to determining fair prices, respondents were 
well aware that CoSP measurements could provide “really random figures.” A Producer Consultant 
dealing with coffee farmers explained that “in the end we’re talking about reality, we’re not making a 
book on the minimum wage plus inflation correlated with PPP.” Respondents realized that formatting 
was an approximation at best. In coffee, if Fairtrade had used a purely “technical” inflation-adjusted 
calculation of the original FTMP set in 1989 (US$1.26/lb), the increase in FTMP would have exceed-
ed one US dollar, rather than just five US cents, as agreed in the coffee price review. Instead, the 
FTMP reflected the political concerns of mainstream coffee roasters who were opposed to any price 
increase. This illustrates how political considerations could become camouflaged under arguments 
around, over, and within the format. 
Second, while procedures were meant to facilitate fair and democratic processes, they also risked 
becoming bureaucratic and ignoring local circumstances. A Standards Committee member justified 
the “quick fix” for cotton prices: “A too formal approach satisfies no-one’s sense of justice.” A Re-
gional Manager in the coffee project noted: As a procedure, the deliberative process “has become such 
a big monster that it’s impossible…to talk to all of them [producers] and take into account all their 
needs.” He added: “You go too much into the process and you forget the people” that risked “conceal-
ing important differences” by aggregating producers under abstract categories. In some cases, the idio-
syncrasies of a particular context could not be captured in a system of rules and procedures.  
Third, the demand to detach oneself from the nexus of relationships often conflicted with parties’ 
“strong attachment, loyalty and commitment” towards particular producer; a respondent noted. A rela-
tional model was anchored in the foundational ethos of Fairtrade as a trading partnership to re-embed 
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anonymous exchanges within relations of care and solidarity. In the rooibos case, ATOs refused to de-
tach themselves from the relationships they had cultivated over time. As evident in the cotton price re-
view, the emotive urgency nourished by face-to-face encounters made participants view the same situ-
ation in a different light. A field visit to India left one SC member deeply disturbed by witnessing the 
plight of small cotton farmers. Advocating a “quick fix” to the FTMP, a flow of emails marked “ur-
gent” explained how “these very poor farmers risk losing out” on “a whole year’s harvest.” The 
Standards Director explained in an email how a single field visit could change one’s reasoning: 
Here we see the impacts of a visit on site! Once you yourself observe reality form close you tend to 
argue differently … and with more emphasis on immediate “help” […] 
 
This quote indicates the difficulty of detaching moral judgment from embodied feelings that were 
triggered by personal experiences. Despite efforts to decenter deliberants from narrow subject posi-
tions, interests would also creep back into deliberative processes. For instance, the negotiations of cof-
fee price were marked by political wrangling, as small producers rallied for a price increase that was 
resisted by many Labelling Initiatives. Thus, while pursuit of impartiality is necessary for avoiding 
partisanship, in practice people may judge through their “gut” feelings and narrow subjective stances, 
even if couching their arguments under the veil of objective reasoning.  
Part 2: Reaching temporary resting points 
Deliberants attempted to reach closures on issues that got bracketed, or “flagged up.” As the almost 
three year duration of the rooibos project indicates, there was risk of an eternal regress of more and 
more issues being bracketed. As parties navigated between conflicting demands to both accommodate 
situational contingencies and follow general principles, they risked deadlocks arising from parties 
holding on to conflicting interpretations about fairness. Yet, as the saying “justice delayed is justice 
denied” suggests, fairness also required that a decision was made at some point, even if it did not sat-
isfy all stakeholders. The Standards Director acknowledged the need to act in the cotton case: 
So, the dilemma is real and a dilemma means that whatever you do you need to be prepared being 
criticized since any decision or outcome to some extent will be wrong, including not acting at all. 
At the end somebody needs to take this responsibility. 
 
We identified two mechanisms through which parties arrived at “temporary resting points” (Weick 
2012, p. 150) on contentious issues, often under pressure to reach a decision in time, such as before 
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the next harvest. Suspending intractables involves putting issues off limits, as attending to them in one 
context could set precedents with ramifications for other contexts. In contrast, when actors were able 
to justify the exceptional nature of a case, which we label exceptionalizing, context-specific adjust-
ments and allowances that deviated from accepted procedures and norms were deemed necessary.  
Suspending intractables: In some cases, a resting point was reached through the suspension of 
particularities in action-contexts. This required judging an issue as “too fundamental” to tackle. Intrac-
table issues, such as the meaning of “sustainable” costs of production, were temporarily suspended for 
the sake of progress in the rooibos case. Parties argued that “the SC cannot take any decision within 5 
minutes” on this issue. Similarly, members refused to take a categorical decision on whether the 
Fairtrade market should be reserved for small farmers or not. A Standards Officer noted: 
Many things that come up in the price setting process have a much more fundamental basis, such 
as who should be our beneficiaries? These are separate questions that require a different approach. 
 
These questions were seen as “fundamental issues” beyond the scope of any particular pricing pro-
ject. In the rooibos case, the politically charged question was deflected by categorizing rooibos as a 
tea (to allow including large plantations), rather than favoring either producer type in principle. Sus-
pending involved provisionally “closing down” contentious debates and “parking” irresolvable issues, 
till such time they would get renewed attention. For instance in the coffee case, the question of how to 
include “family labour” in labor costs was suspended but resulted in a project on the “living wage.” 
Through deliberation cycles, parties would momentarily take certain issues out of the agenda when 
they agreed that resolving them would require deliberation on the contentious underlying principles.  
Exceptionalizing: In some cases, a resting point was reached when a systematic application of 
general principles that ignored “genuine” local concerns was deemed “unfair.” This involved reflexive 
acknowledgement of certain situations as unique and worthy of “making exceptions” and discretion-
ary judgments. When parties could establish that a certain case was an exception, they could justifi-
ably deviate from the valid principle and agree on the need for contextual adjustment. In the rooibos 
case, the Standards Committee decided that apartheid legacies “could not be calculated away” and 
demanded a special pricing formula. The question of exceptionalizing was also at the core of the cot-
ton case. Proponents of a “quick fix” ahead of the regular cotton review highlighted the urgency of the 
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situation that they argued was “special” and warranted “exceptional action.” A Standards Officer ar-
gued: “I can understand you [Standards Unit colleagues] don’t want to set precedents. On the other 
hand, sometimes exceptional action is justified.” An SC member respondent noted in an urgent email: 
Could we account for the fact that we repair one currency case immediately and not all others at 
the same time? The justification lies in the fact that on second glance not all cases are equal.  
 
In this case, making an exception for the upcoming cotton harvest was justified on the basis of ac-
counting for arbitrage opportunities arising from the use of different currencies in different regions. At 
the SC meeting, the member who had personally met affected producers passionately defended a 
“quick fix” without due stakeholder consultation: “What should you consult on? ‘Do you agree that 
dollar has lost value?’” The Committee agreed to adjust cotton prices. Labeling a particular case as an 
exception allows deliberants to justify contextual adjustments and reach temporary resting points. 
Summary of the “ethics as sensemaking” model: Reaching an ethical truce  
To cope with ethical complexity in establishing the meaning of fairness in particular contexts, de-
liberants strive to balance the tension between universalizing principles and situational contingencies 
using three sensemaking mechanisms; formatting, proceduralizing and decentering. However, the 
complexity of what is fair does not allow the tension to be completely resolved. Situational contingen-
cies emerge that resist universalization and get bracketed as unformattable, non-proceduralizable and 
non-decenterable. Residual equivocality leads to sensebreaking and becomes an occasion for renewed 
sensemaking. To reach closure, deliberants then label situational contingencies as either too funda-
mental or case-specific. Suspending intractables and exceptionalizing enables progress towards tem-
porary resting points. Our analysis suggests a recursive process. Deliberations engage in ongoing con-
sultation and debate, iterating between several rounds of sensemaking and sensebreaking. Cycling 
through these rounds, more and more of the bracketed issues are closed through resting points, even if 
temporarily so. Interpretations are redrafted and refined in each round of sensemaking until an ethical 
truce emerges. This is not based on unified consensus. Instead, the model explains how actors deal 
with conflict in situations where no consensual meaning emerges. Parties do not necessarily transform 
their positions radically, but shift them sufficiently to tip the scales towards an agreement. Ethical 
truces may arise not by “the force of the better argument” (Habermas 1996) but by pragmatic concerns 
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whereby parties consent for their own different reasons, without fully transcending their narrow inter-
ests, values, or cultural conceptions. Figure 4 illustrates this process.  
------------------------Insert Figure 4 about here------------------------ 
DISCUSSION  
 
We sought to understand how organizations seeking to act ethically cope with ethical complexity 
and reach a shared agreement. This was motivated in part by an empirical puzzle; how can a “fair” 
price be below the cost of sustainable production of small farmers? The answer lies in the definition of 
what is fair. By studying how organizational participants and stakeholders of Fairtrade deliberated 
over the meaning of “fair prices,” we gained insights into how actors reach ethical truces on contested 
issues in morally ambiguous and equivocal contexts. To be considered fair, a particular ethical issue 
has to be treated as a concrete instantiation of a more generalizable pattern, and thus solved through 
reference to a general principle. At the same time, the particular can never be entirely subsumed under 
the general, and fairness also requires engaging with “the epistemic significance of the particular” 
(Tsoukas 2009, p. 298). We argue that actors cope with ethical complexity through a process of 
sensemaking – a communicative process of establishing joint interpretation of ethical issues. To make 
“something meaningful out of a mess” and be seen as fair, deliberants went through repeated cycles of 
sensemaking and sensebreaking (Pratt 2000). We explain the mechanisms that enable actors to cope 
with “the diversity of voices” in particular contexts, while maintaining “the unity of reason” that 
transcends particular contexts (Habermas 1994). 
Our findings reinforce the potential of adopting a Habermasian lens infused with sensemaking to 
explain how actors cope with ethical challenges. Ethical meanings are neither the outcome of the 
monological application of a universal principle, nor explained only by relativistic intuition in attend-
ing to contextual particularities. Rather, notions of what is ethical or fair are produced through sense-
making – an iterative process of deliberants going back and forth between general principles and con-
textual particularities to create an intersubjective sense of ethical meaning.  
Implications for organizational ethics  
Our analysis of fair price setting in Fairtrade offers insights into organizational scholarship on eth-
ics. Organizational contexts are ripe with disputes around what moral values to invoke, and what is 
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fair and justifiable (e.g., Gehman et al. 2013; Trevino and Weaver 2003). While Habermasian ap-
proaches (e.g., Scherer and Palazzo 2007) explain the normative ideal and the theoretical possibility of 
legitimate consensus among diverse stakeholders, we highlight how deliberants need to make norma-
tive judgments amid considerable ambiguity and conflict to reach plausible agreements. Sensemaking 
explains how contextual cues get “flagged up” or bracketed as issues of concern, and then linked with 
abstract and more general categories (Weick et al. 2005). By integrating insights from sensemaking 
into a Habermasian approach, we explain intersubjective meaning construction, showing how actors 
continually navigate between a universalistic mode of moral reasoning and a particularistic mode of 
contextual judgment, as they construct the meaning of what is ethical in practice (cf., Gehman et al. 
2013). Three main implications for organizational ethics emerge from our study. 
First, while deliberative democracy is a normative theory outlining the conditions for legitimate 
consensus, ethics as sensemaking offers an analytical approach explaining how parties reach a shared 
position in a collective process of ethical meaning making. Deliberative theory does not require con-
sensus to be the inevitable outcome of deliberation (Habermas 2003). However, it is less clear how 
agreement on the acceptability of disputed claims comes about, or how parties reach a negotiated 
compromise in the face of persistent disagreements (McCarthy 1996). A sensemaking perspective 
provides insights into how deliberants come to handle their differences and reach ethical truces. Our 
study suggests that ethical sensemaking is a process of “progressive approximations,” where deliber-
ants refine and redraft their emergent interpretation of the ethical issue “so that it becomes more com-
prehensive, incorporates more of the observed data, and is more resilient in the face of criticism” 
(Weick et al. 2005, p. 415). We explain how parties may not achieve a substantive consensus, yet still 
learn from one another to reach provisional ethical truces (cf., Rao and Kenney 2008) based on vary-
ing degrees of shared meaning (Ansari et al. 2013; Donnellon et al. 1986). These truces are enabled by 
“temporary resting points” (Weick 2012, p. 150) in the ongoing sensemaking process. Rather than re-
solving contentious ethical questions, we found that issues that resisted universalization were “labeled 
in ways that predispose people to find common ground” (Weick et al. 2005, p. 411), such as being 
“too fundamental” which allowed suspending intractables or justifying exceptions. Thus, intersubjec-
tivity may not be strictly about moral validity, where the outcome can claim moral rightness. Instead, 
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the construction of ethical meaning through deliberation may be seen as a process that yields plausible 
ethical truces, which deliberants can accept without fundamentally shifting their ethical stances rather 
than consensual outcomes, where deliberants revise their moral positions to one of higher moral valid-
ity. Ethical truces are provisional, and somewhat pragmatic, if not arbitrary, stabilizations of unre-
solved and possibly irresolvable ethical debates, which can be closed by suspending eternally conten-
tious and undecidable issues. Thus the meaning of what is ethical resides in the process rather than the 
outcome of sensemaking.  
Second, we provide insights for addressing a critical question in the ethics literature (Haidt 2001; 
Sonenshein 2007; Welsh and Ordonez 2014). Is moral reasoning primarily a rational-cognitive pro-
cess based on deliberation, or an emotional process based on moral intuition and affect? Evidence 
from our study suggests that moral reasoning entails both cognitive and emotional modes of judgment 
to deal with situational particularities. As Weick (1995, p. 69) suggests a plausible account is one 
which “captures both feeling and thought.” Deliberation involves both the “intellectual and the pas-
sional” and “desiderative deliberation or deliberative desire” (Nussbaum 1986, pp. 307-8). Deliberants 
continually navigate the tension between dispassionate rational arguments and whether something 
“feels” wrong or right. In real-life ethical dilemmas, individuals carry moral predispositions, including 
sympathy, cooperation, and mutual aid, which Margolis (2004) describes as “moral sentiments.” As 
deliberants engage with the particularities of a situation, they may develop bonds and feelings about 
people potentially affected by a decision. Rather than moral reasoning, their decisions may be shaped 
by affective judgments (Maitlis et al. 2013), moral intuitions and immediate reactions to situational 
contingencies (Zajonc 1980). Moral reasoning may then serve to justify, explain and rationalize judg-
ments post hoc rather than yielding those judgments (Haidt 2001). Individuals do not necessarily act 
like “judges” carefully weighing all available evidence to adjudicate ethical issues. Rather, they may 
act like “attorneys,” using arguments primarily as confirmatory evidence to justify and rationalize in-
tuitions (Baumeister and Newman 1994). In the cotton case, the Standards Committee member who 
witnessed producers’ plight during a field visit, invoked “arbitrage risks” to justify her feelings and 
provide a rational basis for making an exception. The interplay between rational deliberation and in-
tuitive or affective judgments in ethically complex situations offers an exciting research avenue.  
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Third, we suggest the need to revisit some of the ideals of deliberative democracy elaborated in re-
cent debates on political corporate responsibility (e.g., Scherer and Palazzo 2007). In the Habermasian 
sense, the notion of “moral rightness” depends on rational acceptability. But what is rationally ac-
ceptable is also socially constructed and likely to favor those with access to rationally accepted argu-
ments. While democratic dialogue may reduce the disproportionate influence of powerful actors, an 
emphasis on reason giving may prevent the marginalized to articulate their voice particularly in con-
text marked by extreme social inequalities (Fraser 1997; Gibson 2012). In the case of Fairtrade, the 
arguments required to maintain the “fairness” of the dialogue and impartial reasoning, were based on 
invoking “hard” facts and figures that themselves were socially constructed. Other types of arguments 
were denounced as irrational or emotional, and thus devalued. For instance, the debate about whether 
small farmers deserved preferential access to Fairtrade markets was couched in technical terms over 
rooibos’s classification as “tea” or “herb” rather than addressed as an ethical question about apartheid 
legacies that continued to disadvantage black farmers. This limited the kinds of arguments that quali-
fied as legitimate contributions to the dialogue. Scholars, such as feminist ethicists (e.g., Held 2006), 
have argued for preferential treatment of some “deserving” parties beyond rational reason-giving. 
While this could also throw the deliberative process into normative chaos (Habermas 1996), in con-
texts marked by inequalities, the “middle ground” between different positions may not be the most so-
cially beneficial (Sunstein 2001), and “extremes” can be justified over the common ground (cf., Fraser 
1997; Walker, et al. In Press). Outcomes, such as a “fair” price, should not be regarded or presented as 
substantive agreements guaranteeing fairness but as a negotiated compromise in need of ongoing de-
bate. If deliberative processes are at the core of how companies engage in setting norms of governance 
(Scherer and Palazzo 2007), scholars studying these processes need to scrutinize the extent to which 
the epistemic set up is geared towards not only hearing the voice, but also actively addressing the 
needs of marginalized stakeholders. 
Implications for sensemaking 
Our findings also have implications for sensemaking scholars studying how people “produce, ne-
gotiate, and sustain a shared sense of meaning” (Gephart et al. 2010, p. 285; Maitlis and Christianson 
2014). First, while sensemaking is sometimes seen as a largely cognitive process, focused on appraisal 
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and interpretation to develop mental models (Elsbach, Barr and Hargadon 2005), we adopt a commu-
nicative view in line with the notion of social sensemaking (Gephart 1993). But rather than focus on 
“sensegiving” as a way to persuade others (e.g., Maitlis 2005), our study shows the collective process 
of how people make sense together under ambiguity and equivocality. “Giving” and “making” sense 
are simultaneous processes, where communicating parties suggest and discuss plausible interpreta-
tions amid considerable ambiguity, uncertainty, and conflict.  
Second, scholars have infused the sensemaking literature with time –“temporal sensemaking” (e.g., 
Kaplan and Orlikowski 2013); power – “political sensemaking” (e.g., Clark and Geppert 2011), mate-
riality – “ecological sensemaking” (e.g., Whiteman and Cooper 2011) and “emotions” (e.g., Maitlis et 
al. 2013). However, we know little about sensemaking processes in the realm of ethics (Parmar 2014; 
Sonenshein 2007) and CSR (Basu and Palazzo 2008). While the sensemaking literature explains how 
actors make sense of what to do amid disorder, chaos and novelty, our focus on “ethics as sensemak-
ing” engages the relatively unexplored dimension of normativity – e.g., what is good or bad, or fair or 
unfair – in making sense. Normativity suggests that sensemaking processes are influenced by institu-
tionalized expectations (Weber and Glynn 2006) of producing accounts that are ethically justifiable. 
When actors encounter ethical equivocality, they seek to clarify not only what is going on by extract-
ing cues from their immediate environment (Weick 1995) but also collectively interpret these cues in 
light of broader ethical principles to “make sense” of what is plausibly ethical.  
This collective construction highlights the present-oriented “practical-evaluative” element of agen-
cy that is arguably “intrinsically communicative in nature” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, p. 995; 
Weick et al. 2005). As Sandberg and Tsoukas (2014) note the retrospective character of sensemaking 
inherent in Weick’s (1995) account has come at the expense of studying other temporal dimensions of 
sensemaking. Advocates of a post-Weickian approach to sensemaking (Gephart et al. 2010; Stigliani 
and Ravasi 2012) have started to explore the prospective and not just the retrospective dimensions of 
agency. In this study, we highlight the practical-evaluative element of agency – “the capacity of actors 
to make practical and normative judgments …in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas, and 
ambiguities of presently evolving situations” – which “has been strikingly undertheorized by sociolog-
ical thinkers (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, p. 971). Present-oriented sensemaking involves the reflec-
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tive and interpretive work of social actors engaged in the iterative exercise of contextualizing judg-
ment and continually adjusting it to the exigencies of lived situations. In our case, despite set proce-
dures, actors had to continually deal with the residual equivocality of ethical questions through situat-
ed moral judgments in the present. Future work can provide a deeper understanding of the present-
oriented dimension of sensemaking. 
As a single exploratory case, our study raises questions about how our insights apply to other or-
ganizations. Unlike some organizations, resolving ethical complexity was Fairtrade’s core task. This 
rendered the dynamics of theoretical interest more visible, as is typical for “extreme cases” (Pettigrew, 
1990). In attending to these particularities, we provide “heuristic generalizations” that help us refine 
the distinctions through which we understand general processes, while remaining sufficiently open to 
the particularities emerging in other cases (Tsoukas, 2009, p. 287). For example, most organizations 
deal with ethical ambiguities, moral dilemmas and norm breaches that require actors to engage with 
the meaning of what is ethical in particular contexts. While codes of conduct have proliferated to pre-
scribe morally sound behaviors (Trevino and Weaver 2003), the question remains of how companies 
balance generic rules with the contextual messiness of situations. Organizational members need to fol-
low general norms that prescribe appropriate behaviors, yet case particularities require them to engage 
in sensemaking to interpret the meaning of what is ethical in a concrete context.  
CONCLUSION 
Coping with ethical complexity is a key concern for organizations. Moral philosophies posit differ-
ent normative bases for determining what is ethical. At one end, principle-based approaches privilege 
universal rules. At the other end, practice-based approaches privilege situated judgements. Delibera-
tive approaches have sought to bridge this divide by locating ethical validity in intersubjective posi-
tions established through deliberative dialogue. However, while providing a new normative funda-
ment for ethics, they leave open the question of how the tension between ethical principles and prac-
tice is resolved in concrete deliberative situations. We suggest that the notion of ethics as sensemaking 
can provide one possible answer by explaining how deliberants iterate between a Kantian-universalist 
mode of moral reasoning and an Aristotelian-practical mode of situated judgment. Deliberative ap-
proaches and sensemaking thus focus on different aspects of the process of establishing shared mean-
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ing. If deliberative approaches focus on the normative conditions under which communicative ration-
ality can produce intersubjective agreements through “the force of the better argument,” sensemaking 
shifts the focus to how plausible arguments emerge in practice.  
Based on our ethnographic study of multi-stakeholder negotiations about “fair” minimum prices, 
we found that deliberants socially constructed the meaning of what is fair through a collective social 
sensemaking process. This involved five mechanisms. Deliberants made sense through formatting, 
proceduralizing and decentering and dealt with particularities of the situation through suspending in-
tractables and exceptionalizing. Rather than making claims to moral rightness, our analysis highlights 
that agreements are based on approximation and plausibility. When communicative theory is put to 
work in action contexts, a sensemaking lens can explain how actors collectively construct shared 
meaning of what is fair and ethical in practice.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Three price setting projects in comparison 
 
Product Coffee Cotton Rooibos 
Purpose FTMP Review (regular) FTMP Review 
(emergency) 
New FTMP 
Duration > 13 months < 1 month > 35 months 
Producers 
Involved 
> 250 Small Farmer 
Organizations (700,000 
small coffee farmers) 
> 5,000 contract producers 2 Small Farmer 
Organizations and 5 Hired 
Labour plantations 
Initial 
FTMP 
USD 1.2/lb. (Arabica)/ 
USD 1.05 (Robusta) + 
USD 0.05/lb. premium  
USD 0.487/kg for India; 
EUR 0.36/kg for West 
Africa + EUR 0.05/kg 
No FTMP + ZAR 5/kg 
premium 
Con-
flicting 
asks 
Producers demand FTMP 
of US$1.41/lb.  
Vs. no change in FTMP 
SC Members demands a 
“quick fix” to increase 
FTMP in local currency to 
INR 22.34 (0.56 USD) for 
India only 
Vs. proper process 
ATOs demand excluding 
Hired Labour or FTMP of 
ZAR 45/kg (CoSP of small 
farmers)  
Vs. FTMP of ZAR 22.5/kg 
(CoSP of Hired Labour) 
Outcome Increase in FTMP and 
premium by USD 0.05/lb.: 
USD 1.25/lb. (Arabica)/ 
USD 1.05 (Robusta) + 
USD 0.1/lb. premium  
“Quick fix” setting higher 
FTMP in local currency: 
INR 22.34 (0.56 USD) for 
India 
Special pricing formula: 
Small Farmers: ZAR 25/kg 
+ ZAR 5/kg premium  
Hired Labour: ZAR 18/kg 
+ ZAR 12/kg premium  
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Table 2: Particularities and emergent contingencies in three price setting projects  
 
 Coffee Cotton Rooibos 
D
ef
in
iti
on
al
 a
m
bi
gu
iti
es
 What costs should be included 
in CoSP? How are labor costs 
calculated, e.g. family labor? 
What is a living wage? Do low 
labor costs mean efficient 
production or indecent pay?  
- “Every producer has 
different costs, what do we 
include in the costs? If you 
have family labour, how do 
you calculate the costs? Do 
you calculate 1$ a day or 10$ 
a day? There are so many 
different things, which you 
don't know in advance....” 
(Standards Officer) 
How to calculate CoSP given 
currency fluctuations in 
different geographical origins? 
Should FTMP be set in local 
currency or USD?  
- “If we switch everything to 
dollars, the FTMP would still 
be irrelevant in India, but at 
least the African producers 
would not be losing out. If we 
switch to local currencies, 
then the Indians earn more - 
not sure what happens to the 
Africans, and … the Brazilian, 
Peruvian, and Egyptians.” 
(SC Member on currency use) 
What does average CoSP 
mean given stark differences 
in producer types? What does 
sustainable production mean 
versus inefficiency? How to 
deal with historical injustices 
of apartheid South Africa?  
- “We should be cautious with 
lowering the price too far. 
CoSP of small farmers is much 
higher than that of plantation. 
The question is, how do we set 
a price for these quite rather 
distinct organizations?” (SC 
Member [expert]on rooibos) 
E
xi
ge
nc
ie
s a
nd
 c
ir
cu
m
st
an
ce
s Centralized procedures are 
unable to take into account 
differences in capability, 
skills, development level of 
256 producer organizations in 
>27 origins? 
- “In the past it was really 
easy to grab the phone and 
talk to one of the ten 
stakeholders. I mean in the 
very beginning we're talking 
about 10 producers, and 
maybe 5 traders for each 
product.” (Producer 
Consultant, Latin America) 
How to deal with emergency 
situations? What counts as an 
emergency situation?  
- SC Chair: “Are you for or 
against a quick fix?” 
- SC Member [trader]: “I 
think it’s the right thing to do. 
But if you do it once…” 
- Standards Officer: “We 
know that. But it’s about 
timing!” 
- SC Member [producer]: 
“It’s an emergency case.”  
(SC debate on cotton) 
Procedures do not provide 
guidance to deal with unusual 
circumstances?  
- “Rooibos was actually a very 
special case. It's got a political 
history, it's got a social 
history, land rights 
distribution etc.” (Producer 
Consultant, India) 
“You never have a nice 
consultation feedback that you 
can take and say: ‘this is 
clear, that is the right 
solution’” (Pricing Officer) 
So
ci
al
 a
tt
ac
hm
en
ts
 Field workers build close 
relationships with producers. 
- “My Liaison Officers miss 
their children’s birthdays, they 
miss weddings and funerals 
because they are out there 
with the producers! ... You 
build relationships, you feel 
very passionate! …Every 
single day they’re receiving a 
push from one of us in the 
system. We want this done!” 
(Producer Consultant, India) 
Moral judgment affected by 
face-to-face encounters. 
-“The problem is whenever 
you go to the field the pro-
ducer will of course flag up 
the issues, of course the price 
will always be too low…I think 
all Producer Liaison staff are 
facing that every day.” 
(Standards Officer) 
It’s hard not to lose the 
neutrality!” (Pricing Officer) 
ATOs committed to Fairtrade 
ethos of trading partnership 
requires attention to needs. 
“For me it’s best what the 
ATOs do. It is a commitment 
from the part of the trader that 
they are trading fairly, that 
they are giving a fair price to 
the producer by negotiating 
this with the producer based 
on that person’s need.” 
(Pricing Officer) 
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Figure 1: Timelines for three price setting projects (Cotton, Coffee, Rooibos) in comparison 
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Figure 2: Data Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Sensemaking mechanisms to cope the tensions between universalizable reason (aiming 
at universality) and contextual judgment (attending to particularity) 
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Figure 4: A process model of collective sensemaking on ethics 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
i By 2007, the Wupperthal cooperative had grown to 220 members (average 0.68 hectares) producing 120 metric 
tons, and Heiveld cooperative to 49 members (average 5 hectares) producing 38 metric tons, much of which was 
directly exported into Fairtrade markets at premium prices. 
ii In the South African context, “colored” refers to mixed race. 
iiiIn contrast to coffee, which exclusively reserved Fairtrade certification to “Small Producers' Organizations,” 
the tea category was accessible to “Hired Labour” plantations. This anomaly came about from Fairtrade’s in-
volvement in India, where tea production was controlled by large plantations – a post-colonial legacy. 
